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This paper examines the relationship between faculty participation in university decision
making and university performance. Using an aggregated measure of faculty
participation, McCormick and Meiners (1988) find that increased faculty control in
decision making is associated with lower levels of institutional performance. Building on
the existing university governance literature, this paper argues that the optimal level of
faculty participation varies by decision type. Disaggregating the data by faculty
participation into different decision types produces results that are consistent with this
hypothesis. Increased faculty participation may be good or bad; the effects vary by the
type of decisions in which faculty participate.
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Faculty Participation in University Governance
 and the Effects on University Performance
“The objective of a not-for-profit firm is more complicated than that of
many for profit firms, maximizing profits. There is no corresponding
simple objective for a not-for-profit firm. For example, a college does not
seek to maximize the difference between tuition and costs. Instead it is
simultaneously concerned with the welfare of its students, faculty,
administrators, alumni, and donors. Many decisions of a college involve
the balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of these groups.”
(Carlton and Perloff (1994), p. 16)
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature that focuses on the role of stakeholders in
organizational governance. Several authors have argued that employees have at least a
partial residual claimancy status in the firm and therefore have the incentive and right to
participate in organizational decision making (e.g. Blair (1995) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1992)). Universities and other non-profit organizations provide fertile ground for such
analysis; the competing interest groups with competing goals create the need for a system
of shared governance and mutual monitoring. The existing literature concerning agency
problems and academic production suggests that faculty control over certain types of
academic decisions may lead to improved performance. McPherson and Schapiro (1999)
provide an overview of this literature and a useful discussion of authority delegation
within the university.
In the only empirical study to examine the relationship between faculty
participation in decision-making and university performance, McCormick and Meiners
(1988) find that university performance suffers as the faculty’s control over decision2
making increases. They argue that the problems associated with team production make
active faculty participation in university governance ineffective. However, they group
faculty participation in different types of decisions into a single measure of faculty
participation.  This paper provides a more detailed analysis of the role of stakeholders,
including faculty members, in university governance. The predictions are that faculty
participation in certain types of decisions, namely those where faculty may have better
incentives and information, will lead to improved performance. The implications of this
analysis are then tested using a similar data set to the one used in McCormick and
Meiners. The results indicate the effects of faculty participation vary by the type of
decisions in which faculty participate . Greater faculty control over decisions concerning
academic performance is associated with increased university performance; greater
faculty over decisions concerning organizational management is associated with lower
levels of university performance.
2. University Governance
2.1 University Decision Making
The primary argument of McCormick and Meiners is that higher quality decisions
are made when decision control is concentrated. In their model, the choice is between
centralized administrative decision making and collective faculty decision making.
McCormick and Meiners acknowledge that faculty members provide valuable assistance
and advice to administrators especially in areas concerning faculty evaluation, research
programs, and curricula. However, they conclude that the benefits of faculty participation
are insufficient to outweigh the costs associated with collective decision making. As a3
result, efficient governance requires that faculty members be limited to input but not
control over these decisions.
While centralized decision making by administrators avoids the problems
associated with collective decision making, it also creates the potential for abuse by
administrators. The university’s non-profit status ensures that there are no residual
claimants to provide the monitoring role normally played by shareholders and no
secondary market for ownership or control to constrain managerial behavior. In addition,
universities normally have endowments that help insulate administrators from the effects
of poor decisions. McCormick and Meiners recognize the agency problem but argue that
university boards of trustees effectively monitor university administrators (Fama and
Jensen (1983a, 1983b)).
Within the university there are several important stakeholder groups 
__ trustees,
administrators, faculty, and students 
__ that have competing interests. This paper argues
that the other stakeholders monitor administrators. In addition, efficient organizational
governance results in different interest groups maintaining control over different types of
decisions. As with McCormick and Meiners, this paper assumes that the upper level
administrators are involved in most decisions. The difference is that trustees, faculty
members, and students are expected to have some degree of participation in subsets of the
broad range of decisions made within the university. However, the efficient level of
interest group participation varies across decision type.
Evaluating overall university performance is difficult because of the lack of a
well-defined maximand. For the purposes of the analysis, I assume that there is some
overall measure of university performance or prestige and that each interest group4
benefits from an increase in this performance/prestige. However, none of these groups
have a true residual claim on the performance of the institution. Each group attempts to
maximize its own well being, which at times may be inconsistent with maximizing the
overall performance of the university. The analysis that follows attempts to focus on what
each interest group within the university is likely to maximize. Special attention is paid to
the role of faculty because the available empirical data speak directly to faculty
participation in governance decisions. The optimal university governance system will
minimize the overall agency costs.
2.2 University Trustees
Even with a recognizable standard of performance, the effectiveness of corporate
boards has been widely questioned. Corporate board members, like university board
members, are often busy executives with little time to actively participate in decision
making. University boards undoubtedly have similar problems that may be compounded
by the lack of a well-defined performance measure. In addition, the available signals of
university performance are noisy and administrators may be able to increase current
prestige at the expense of future prestige. The lack of competitive market feedback makes
it difficult for trustees to evaluate administrative decisions. Finally, the complex and
highly specialized nature of academic output makes it even more difficult for university
trustees to properly evaluate current administrative decisions in many areas.
As a result of information problems trustees are not likely to participate directly in
decisions concerning academic personnel, curriculum, faculty governance, or issues of
student life. In addition, the extent to which trustees actually monitor and evaluate these
decisions will also be limited because of these same factors.There is also reason to5
believe that even well-informed trustees might not be solely interested in maximizing the
prestige of the institution. Donors and trustees may attempt to influence existing
academic policies or start new academic programs that are important to those individuals
but not in the best interest of the university (Brown (1997)).
Trustees are often wealthy individuals that have made large gifts to the institution.
In addition, university trustees often have experience evaluating the financial and broader
managerial operations of large organizations. As a result trustees are more likely to be
comfortable participating in financial decisions and general university administration
decisions. Finally, given that many trustees are also alumni of the college or parents of
current students, the trustees may also be more informed and feel more comfortable with
issues of student life. This does not need to imply that university boards actively manage
these functions of the university but that the trustees are at least actively involved in the
evaluation, ratification, and performance monitoring of these decisions.
2.3 Faculty Members
There is a growing literature that focuses on the role of employees in
organizational governance. Hansmann (1996) points out that both the biggest advantage
and the biggest disadvantage of employee ownership springs from employee participation
in governance decisions. The advantage is that employees generally have a non-
recoverable investment in the success of the firm and better information about the quality
of many decisions than would other owners. The disadvantage is that employees may
favor decisions that are detrimental to the enterprise if the gains in their employee
benefits exceed their losses as owners.
While there are no true owners in the university, Brown argues that the nature of6
academic employment contracts make faculty members partial residual claimants to the
success of the institution. As a result, the wealth of individual faculty members will be
tied to the success of the institution but faculty members have an incentive to enrich
themselves at the expense of the institution’s success. In addition, faculty members
provide an inexpensive source of information concerning the performance of the
university and administrators. One expects that university governance decisions are
structured so that faculty members will participate more heavily in those activities where
their informational advantages and expertise outweigh any malincentive effects.
 Faculty members are likely to have better information for decisions concerning
curriculum, the creation of new academic programs and general faculty governance
decisions than do trustees. As noted above, trustees have less information and may have
poorer incentives in regards to these decisions. While faculty members have better
information concerning curricular decisions, they may not always have the proper
incentives for making these decisions at the individual level. For example, individual
faculty members and departments will benefit if more resources are devoted to their areas
of specialization. We expect individual sub-groups of the faculty to attempt to influence
curricular decisions in a manner that strengthens their own interests. However, this may
not increase the overall prestige of the institution.
 It is still possible that faculty members as a group have less incentive to misuse
resources in these areas. While individual faculty members or small groups of faculty
members may have poor incentives, there are few curriculum or programmatic decisions
that will benefit the majority of faculty members without increasing the entire
institution’s success. As long as the potential for log rolling behavior is small, then it is7
less likely that the majority of faculty members will support bad decisions concerning
curriculum and new programs.
1 As a result, the informational advantages of faculty
participation may outweigh the costs of collective decision making in the areas of
curriculum and general faculty governance.
The monitoring of administrators by faculty members necessarily creates conflict.
If administrators retain the right to hire, fire, and otherwise determine faculty rewards,
then faculty members are unlikely to actively criticize administrative decisions. Coehlo
(1976) argues that tenure exists in order to elicit faculty monitoring without the threat of
reprisal. This explanation suggests that faculty members play a greater role in, and
possibly maintain control over, decisions concerning appointment, promotions, and
tenure (APT). Otherwise, administrators would have greater ability to discipline faculty
members that criticized administrative decisions, which would lead to less than the
optimal level of faculty monitoring.
The informational advantages that faculty members have are particularly
important for APT decisions. McPherson and Winston (1983) argue that it is difficult for
administrators and even faculty members from other disciplines to properly evaluate the
quality of a scholars work. While it is possible that the institution could rely solely on
outside evaluations from scholars in the same field for APT decisions, McPherson and
Winston argue that this does not completely avoid the information problem. Faculty
members in the same school or department have better information about the individual’s
current and expected future work habits and how well the individual fits within the
current department. Given that it is the internal or local faculty members that must  live
with the consequences of there choices, McPherson and Winston argue that local faculty8
input must play an important role in APT decisions.
There are, however, alternative views concerning faculty participation in APT
decisions. In Carmichael’s (1988) model of academic tenure, administrators are not able
to judge the quality of job candidates but are able to evaluate new hires after a period of
time on the job. As a result, faculty members are expected make appointment decisions
but are less likely to make subsequent performance evaluations.
2  Carmichael’s view does
not suggest that faculty members are not active in other decisions but that they are more
active in appointment decisions.
McKenzie’s (1979, 1996) model of tenure stresses the political infighting and the
changing political coalitions that arise in academics. Even without becoming obsolete,
competent teachers and researchers could find themselves being pushed out of a
department where their outputs were once highly valued. As a result McKenzie suggests
that it is most important that faculty members be protected from other faculty members.
If efficient long term contracting requires stable lifetime employment, then administrators
may serve a larger role in the evaluation and compensation of individual faculty
members. The reason is that faculty members may not sufficiently reward the political or
professional outcasts in the context of an optimal lifetime employment model.
McKenzie’s model suggests that greater administrative influence is important in
performance evaluation during the later (post tenure) stages of the academic career.
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In addition, faculty members and administrators may value different types of
output. Faculty members are likely to place more weight on outcomes including research,
professional recognition and departmental service. Administrators may be more likely to
reward college wide and community service. For example, departments generally place9
little weight on activities that bring public recognition to the institution (i.e. television
appearances, service on important government panels or commissions), or create
development opportunities (i.e. meeting with or making presentations to alumni groups or
potential donors). If these activities are important to the overall success of the institution,
then it may take more administrative participation in performance evaluation decisions to
ensure optimal faculty participation in these activities. An important question is whether
the level of administrative participation is more important for APT decisions than for
other reward decisions.  As a result, APT and other performance evaluation decisions are
treated separately in the empirical section of the paper.
The one area where the interest of the majority of the faculty is likely to diverge
from the interests of the institution is in the case of budgetary decisions. In these
decisions it is more likely that the faculty as a whole can reach agreements to enrich
themselves at the expense of the university. Diverting financial resources to their
personal use (i.e. supporting smaller class sizes, reduced teaching loads, higher salaries,
larger offices, or nice faculty clubs) is almost always in the best interest of the faculty.
Existing faculty members also have an incentive to favor current uses of funds over
future uses. In addition, the average faculty member has considerably less expertise than
trustees in these areas. As a result, faculty members are not expected to participate in or
be the primary monitors of financial decisions.
The extent to which faculty members participate in administrative decisions is
likely to be related to the type of decisions. For example, decisions concerning admission,
student aid, buildings and grounds are best handled by specialized administrators with
expertise in these areas. The size of academic departments and resource allocation10
decisions among departments are also likely to be left to administrators. This helps to
reduce political infighting and coalition building that might otherwise develop among
faculty groups. In general, we expect that administrators and not faculty members retain
the primary control over the day-to-day operations of the institution and general
administrative decisions.
 2.4 Students
Students and alumni also have an incentive to monitor administrative decision
making. Administrative decisions that affect the quality of academic and student life will
have a direct impact on existing students. Students are likely to be the group with
sufficient incentive and information about decisions concerning student dining, housing
services, career services, and other aspects of student life. Therefore, we expect students
to play an important role in such decisions. As noted above, alumni trustees may also
have valuable information and participate more heavily in these decisions as well.
It is possible that faculty involvement helps to support and strengthen student
involvement in these areas. Unless faculty members are able to add valuable information
to the decision process, however, increased faculty participation is most likely to divert
faculty resources away from more useful pursuits.
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2.5 Summary
The purpose of this paper is not to develop a unified theory of university
governance but to point out that faculty members are likely to play an important role in
university governance. The extent to which decision control is efficiently concentrated in
the hands of faculty members is dependent upon the incentives and abilities the faculty
members have relative to trustees and/or administrators. Faculty are expected to have a11
greater influence over decisions concerning appointments and tenure, curriculum, and
general faculty governance; while administrators are expected to play a greater role in
decisions concerning the use of financial resources and broader issues of university
governance and management. While trustees monitor all decisions, they are expected to
have the most direct influence over major decisions and decisions involving large
amounts of financial capital. There is less agreement in the literature on whether faculty
or administrators will be responsible for making decisions concerning individual faculty
rewards and assignments.
In addition, different universities may solve different incentive problems in
different ways and the optimal level of faculty participation in different governance
decisions may vary across institutions. However, the above discussion provides some
insights into the expected level of faculty participation in different decisions. If increased
faculty participation affects decision making as noted above, then the empirical tests
should indicate the existence of the suggested relationship between increased faculty
participation and performance.
3. Measuring Faculty Participation and Performance
The 1970 AAUP survey of faculty governance used by McCormick and Meiners
provides the measures of faculty participation in decision making.
5 While the survey is
over twenty-five years old, it remains as the only comprehensive survey of faculty
participation in university governance that is available. Following McCormick and
Meiners, faculty control over a decision is defined as those instances where the decision
is reported as being made by the faculty or jointly by the faculty and administration.12
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the decision control variable for the thirty-one
survey questions. Faculty control ranges from a high of 96.58% for decisions concerning
academic performance to a low of 7.02% for decisions concerning long range budgetary
planning. On average faculty members play a greater role in decisions concerning
curriculum (6-11) and faculty governance (23-27). Faculty members have less control
over decisions involving organizational management, the choice of organizational
leaders, and budgetary planning (12-21).
For the formal analysis we define seven groups of decisions: appointment,
promotion, and tenure decisions (1- 4); curricular decisions (6-10); faculty governance
decisions (23-27); general administration (11-16); budgetary decisions (17,19-21);
student governance decisions (28-31); and individual reward/punishment decisions
(5,18,22). Table 2 provides summary statistics for these groups.
Faculty members have the most control over curriculum decisions and the least
control over financial decisions. That there is considerable variation in the extent to
which faculty members control different types of decisions is supportive of the main idea
of this paper. The arguments noted above suggest little role for faculty participation in
financial decisions. It is not surprising that the data indicate that faculty members play a
very limited role (15.03%) in such decisions. Faculty members do not seem to play an
important role in decisions concerning the day to day management of the organization
(23.89%). These are the areas where the McCormick and Meiners’ explanation is most
likely to apply.
Faculty members are expected to play an important role in decisions concerning
curriculum and faculty governance. The results indicate that faculty members are most13
likely to control these decision groups (84.08% and 74.25%).  The average level of
faculty control over appointment promotion and tenure decisions (40.28%) and individual
performance and evaluation decisions (42.92%) is much lower. In general, this is
consistent with the existing literature where there is some remaining disagreement about
the optimal level of faculty control over personnel decisions. Finally, faculty members
exhibit control over 51.63% of student governance decisions. This number seems high
given the discussion above but it is likely that the survey response measures the extent of
faculty participation relative to administrative and not student participation in these
decisions.
McCormick and Meiners use the average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores
of the incoming freshmen class in 1971 as a measure of overall university quality. We use
the same measure for the incoming freshman class in 1968.
6 In addition we also use the
average faculty salary in 1969 and an overall university rating calculated by Gourman
(1967).
7 While the exact procedures used to compute the Gourman rating are not made
public, this measure has been used by others (e.g. Solmon (1975), Leslie and Ramey
(1988)) as an overall measure of university quality and provides a comparison for the
other performance measures.
In addition to modeling university performance as a function of faculty
participation in university governance, we control for other aspects of university
performance. Complete and reliable data is available for the performance and governance
measures for 468 universities using the SAT variable, 496 universities using the
Gourman variable, and 535 universities using the salary measure. The combined sample
includes 584 different universities. The control variables used are similar to McCormick14
and Meiners with the exception of the salary measure. Table 3 provides summary
statistics for these variables and the dependent variables. As with McCormick and
Meiners we expect that higher tuition, larger libraries, higher revenue per student, more
PhDs granted, and a longer institutional lifetime to be associated with higher quality
institutions on average. Likewise, we expect public institutions, schools with higher
student faculty ratios, and larger schools to be less selective and have lower quality
ratings. If faculty participation in governance is related to performance, then the
governance variables should explain a portion of the variation in university quality
variables not explained by the control variables.
4. The Empirical Relationship between Faculty Participation and Performance
The main conclusion from the previous discussion is that faculty participation in
different types of decisions is related to performance in different ways.  In order to
examine this relationship, the performance variables are regressed on the faculty
participation and control variables. Table 4 presents the OLS results. Approximately ten
percent of the variation in both performance variables can be explained by the
governance variables alone. Greater faculty control over APT decisions and faculty
governance decisions is associated with increased performance. All coefficients are
significant at conventional levels except for the faculty governance variable with the
Gourman performance measure. The results are economically significant as well. For
example, faculty control over an additional APT decision leads to an increase in SAT
scores of 25 points, in Gourman ratings of 15 points, and in salary of $318. Faculty
control over curriculum decisions is positively related to both the SAT and Gourman15
measure but only significant for the Gourman variable.
 Greater faculty participation in general administration decisions and financial
decisions is negatively related to performance. However, the general administration
variable is only significant when SAT scores are the dependent variable. Greater faculty
participation in individual decisions is not significantly related to either performance
measure. The relationship between faculty control over student governance decisions and
SAT scores is negative and significant. That variable is positively but not significantly
related to the other measures of performance.
8
The addition of the control variables weakens the economic and statistical
significance of the faculty governance measures (Table 5). The APT, general
administration, and curriculum variables are still positive and significant in each case that
they were significant in the original specification. However, the coefficient estimates are
smaller in each case. The largest change is that faculty participation in financial decisions
only remains significantly related to SAT scores. However, the negative relationship
between faculty control over general administration decisions now has significant
negative relationship with each performance measure. Faculty participation in individual
decisions is now significantly negatively related to the Gourman rating. The control
variables have the predicted signs and most are statistically significant.
Given the difficulty in measuring university performance, it is not surprising that
the different measures of performance produce differing results. That all three measures
of performance are positively related to faculty participation in decisions concerning
appointment, promotion, and tenure supports the emerging literature on university
governance. The importance of specialized knowledge and the need for faculty members16
to be able to actively participate in the monitoring of administrative decisions without
fear of dismissal are possible explanations. That greater faculty participation in general
administration decisions is associated with lower levels of performance is not surprising.
These seem to be the primary types of decisions with which McCormick and Meiners
were concerned. Likewise, the subsequent literature is nearly unanimous in its support of
maintaining administrative control over these decisions.
One of the surprising aspects of these results concerns the lack of a consistently
significant negative relationship between faculty control over financial decisions and
university performance. There is little in the existing literature to support faculty control
over these decisions. The literature is also consistent in stressing the importance of
faculty participation in curriculum decisions. However, neither of these variables is
consistently related to performance. One explanation is that the extent of faculty
participation in these areas fits the predictions so well. Faculty members have very little
input into financial decisions in our sample. Likewise, faculty members maintain almost
complete control of curriculum decisions across the institutions in the sample. As a result,
the small variation that does occur is not significantly related to performance.
9
It is important to not that the observed relationships between faculty participation
and performance may not be evidence of a causal relationship between faculty
participation in decision making and performance. The discussion in Section 2 suggests
that there may be some optimal level or range of faculty participation in governance
decisions and that level varies across the type of decisions. The empirical results confirm
that faculty participation is related to performance and that the relationship does vary by
decision type. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the support of a causal17
relationship. An alternative explanation is that less successful institutions attract lower
quality faculty members that are not allowed to actively participate in decision making.
The institutional factors that result in lower quality faculty members also lead to lower
SAT scores, lower salaries, and lower ratings of overall institutional  quality.
McCormick and Meiners note that there may also be a potential endogeneity
problem with their results. Using the same AAUP survey results as in this paper, Masten
(1997) finds that the extent of faculty control over decisions is a function of institutional
characteristics suggesting a similar problem. While his measures of faculty control and
his procedures are different, this still suggests that the faculty participation variables used
here are not independent of the control variables used in our analysis. Without any well
defined instruments for faculty participation besides those included in our control
variables, this leaves few options. In order to address this problem we regress each of the
seven faculty participation measures on the control variables. The faculty performance
variables were then regressed on the residuals from each regression.
The results reported in Table 6 are very similar for the SAT variable to those
reported in column (1) of Table 4. For the Gourman and salary variables, the signs of the
estimates are the same and coefficient estimates are similar but none of the estimates are
significant at conventional levels.
10 These results indicate a weaker relationship between
faculty participation and performance. The problem is that this approach assumes that the
control variables influence faculty participation and not vice versa. This makes it more
likely that we reject participation being related to performance. So these results must be
interpreted with caution.18
5. Conclusions
The results of this paper are consistent with the idea that faculty participation is
important in decisions where faculty members have better information and better
incentives than administrators or trustees. While these results are not necessarily
inconsistent with the original arguments of McCormick and Meiners, they do suggest that
it is important to control for the areas in which faculty members exert decision control.
The observed empirical relationships are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that faculty
participation in governance influences performance. However, the overall impact of this
participation varies by the types of decisions in which faculty participate. While faculty
decision making necessarily involves many of the costs associated with collective
decision making, in some cases these additional costs are outweighed by the benefits
associated with faculty control. In addition, this paper points out the need for better and
more comprehensive measures of both university performance and governance.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Kelly Bedard, Richard Burdekin, Eric Helland, and Janet
Smith for comments and suggestions. Jeff Chang and Ching Lim provided invaluable
research assistance. This research benefited from the financial support of The John
Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation. The author is solely responsible for its
content including any remaining errors.Bibliography
American Universities and Colleges, 1968, Washington: American Council on Education.
Blair, M., 1995, Ownership and Control, Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Brown, W.O., 1997, “University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property  Rights 
Explanation,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153, 441-461.
Carlton, D.W., and Perloff, J.M., 1994, Modern Industrial Organization 2
nd edition, New 
York: HarperCollins.
Carmichael, H.L., 1988, “Incentives in Academics: Why is there Tenure?” Journal of 
Political Economy 96, 453-472.
Coelho, P.R.P., 1976, “Rules, Authorities, and the Design of Not-For-Profit Firms,” 
The Journal of Economic Issues 10, 416-428.
Dolan, R.C., Jung, C.R., and Schmidt, R.M., 1985, “Evaluating Educational Inputs in 
Undergraduate Education,” The Review of Economics and  Statistics 67, 514-520.
Fama, E.F., and Jensen, M.C., 1983a, “Separation of Ownership and Control” The 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-26.
Fama, E.F., and Jensen, M.C., 1983b, “Agency Problems and Residual Claims” The 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, 327-50.
Gourman, J., 1967, The Gourman Report: Ratings of American Colleges and 
Universities, Los Angeles: The Continuing Education Institute, Inc.
Hansmann, H.B., 1996, The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Leslie, L.L. and Ramey, G., 1988, “Donor Behavior and Voluntary Support for Higher 
Education Institutions,” Journal of Higher Education, 115-132.
Masten, S.E., 1997, “The Internal Organization of Higher Education; Or Why 
Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized As Markets,” Working Paper: 
University of Michigan Business School.
McCormick, R.E. and Meiners, R., 1989, “University Governance: A Property Rights 
Perspective,” The Journal of Law and Economics 31, 423-442.
McKenzie, R.B., 1979, “The Economic Basis of Departmental Discord in Academe,” 
Social Science Quarterly, 60(1), 653-664.
McKenzie, R.B., 1996, “In Defense of Academic Tenure,” Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 152, 325-341.
McPherson, M.S., and Schapiro, M. O., 1999, “Tenure Issues in Higher Education,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(1), 85-98.
McPherson, M.S., and Winston, G.C., 1983, “The Economics of Academic Tenure: A 
Relational Perspective,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4, 163-
184.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., 1992, Economics, Organization & Management, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Report of Subcommittee T, 1971, AAUP Bulletin Spring, 69-124.
Solmon, L.C., 1975, “The Definition of College Quality and Its Impact on Earnings.” 
Explorations In Economic Research 2, 443-60.                                                                                                                                                
Table 1
AAUP Faculty Governance Survey Results
                                                                                                                                                
Percentage of Institutions where
Decisions Concerning Decision is Controlled by Faculty
                                                                                                                                                
1. Appointments   40.41%
2. Reappointments or Nonrenewal   35.27%
3. Promotions   41.10%
4. Tenure   44.35%
5. Dismissal for Cause   41.10%
6. Curriculum   86.64%
7. Degree Requirements   84.25%
8. Academic Performance   96.58%
9. Types of Degrees Offered   75.68%
10. Establishment of New Programs   77.23%
11. Admission Requirements   52.05%
12. Relative Staff Sizes of Academic Disciplines   16.10%
13. Program For Buildings...Facilities   12.16%
14. Presidential Selection   11.64%
15. Academic Deans’ Selection   18.32%
16. Department Chairpersons’ Selection   33.05%
17. Faculty Salary Scales   10.27%
18. Individual Faculty Salaries   13.01%
19. Short Range Budgetary Planning (3-5 yrs)     9.42%
20. Long Range Budgetary Planning     7.02%
21. Average Teaching Loads   33.39%
22. Teaching Assignments   74.66%
23. Specification ... Department Committees   76.88%
24. Membership Departmental Committees   78.77%
25. Authority of Faculty in Government   56.34%
26. Specification ... Senate Committees   75.68%
27. Membership Senate Committees   83.56%
28. Academic Discipline   70.38%
29. Specification Student Extracurricular Rules   37.67%
30. Extracurricular Behavior of Students   37.67%
31. Student Role in Institutional Government   60.79%
                                                                                                                                                
Data Source: AAUP (1971)                                                                                                                                                
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Faculty Governance
Variables by Decision Type
                                                                                                                                                
                    Standard
Decision Group                                  Mean             Deviation
                                                                                                                                                
APT Decisions        40.28% 42.95%
Curriculum Decisions        84.08% 28.29%
Faculty Governance Decisions        74.25% 29.88%
Organizational Governance Decisions        23.89% 24.10%
Financial Decisions        15.03% 23.75%
Individual Performance Decisions        42.92% 29.21%
Student Governance Decisions        51.63% 36.10%
                                                                                                                                                
In all cases, the number of observations is 584 and the range of actual outcomes is from
0% to 100%.                                                                                                                                                
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Performance Variables
and University Characteristics
                                                                                                                                                
Standard
Variable  N               Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
                                                                                                                                                
Performance Variables
Gourman Rating 526     393.6     74.38    251.0       772.0
Combined SAT Score 496     1,058     134.9    525.0       1,429
Average Faculty 
Salary in 1969 556   10,550     1,582    6,937      16,272
Control Variables
Tuition 584   944.19   615.98           0        3,600
Library Volumes 567 241,784 365,219  16,039 3,714,642
Age 583     93.23    38.72    10.00        278.0
Public 598     0.396      0.490           0               1
Student Faculty Ratio 581     16.14     6.993           1         93.56
Revenue per Student 560     2,316     1,776   102.82       21,557
Enrollment 583     4,701     6,235   124.00       44,651
PhDs Granted per
Faculty Member 1957-66  567     0.104     0.335           0         3.007
                                                                                                                                                
Data Sources:  AAUP (1971), American Universities and Colleges (1968),The Gourman 
Report (1967)                                                                                                                                                
Table 4
The Estimated Relationship between University
Governance and Performance without Control Variables
                                                                                                                                                
     SAT Gourman Faculty
     Scores Rating Salaries
Intercept    976.849 353.103 9884.480
   (13.37)*** (30.27)*** (41.90)***
APT Decisions    25.052  14.88  318.482
   (5.54)***  (6.01)***  (6.33)***
Curriculum Decisions    4.288  5.01 -12.438
   (0.90)  (1.96)**  (0.24)
Faculty Governance    18.855  0.966  89.438
Decisions    (4.03)***  (0.37)  (1.67)*
Organizational Governance   -12.300 -3.815 -42.426
Decisions    (2.20)**  (1.28)  (0.68)
Financial Decisions  -18.271 -9.018 -152.537
  (2.35)**  (2.14)**  (1.73)*
Individual Decisions     0.818 -3.317 -20.960
   (0.09)  (0.68)  (0.21)
Student Governance -10.468  3.219  25.298
Decisions   (2.24)**  (1.24)  (0.48)
Adjusted R
2   0.1184 0.0945 0.1021
Observations      468    496    534
                                                                                                                                    
Notes to Table 4: t-statistics in parenthesis. One star indicates the 10 percent level of
significance; two stars, 5 percent; three stars, 1 percent.                                                                                                                                                
Table 5
The Estimated Relationship between University
Governance and Performance with Control Variables
                                                                                                                                                
SAT Gourman Faculty
Scores Rating Salaries
Intercept  901.264 296.749 8246.813
 (27.26)***  (24.33)***   (24.81)***
APT Decisions   15.136    4.495   125.313
 (3.75)***  (3.02)***   (3.20)***
Curriculum Decisions   -3.309    2.716      5.448
 (0.78)  (1.74)*   (0.13)
Faculty Governance   17.348   0.927    77.611
Decisions  (4.26)***  (0.61)   (1.86)*
Organizational Governance  -11.922  -4.170  -78.000
Decisions  (2.47)***  (2.37)**   (1.65)*
Financial Decisions -10.964  -0.826  -10.195
 (1.63)*  (0.33)   (0.15)
Individual Decisions    2.080  -8.083  -58.410
 (0.27)  (2.80)***   (0.75)
Student Governance -10.982   1.721     9.507
Decisions  (2.70)***  (1.12)   (0.24)
Tuition   84.560  16.661 536.224
(in thousands of dollars)  (6.90)***  (3.63)***   (4.30)***
Library Volumes   27.573  85.646 782.000
(in Millions)  (1.09)  (8.74)***   (3.07)***
Age    0.106    0.249     1.609
 (0.75)  (4.51)***   (1.12)
Public  22.410    1.059 973.137
 (1.50)  (0.19)   (6.53)***Student-Faculty Ratio  -1.390  -0.419    -7.342
 (1.36)  (1.10)    (0.69)
Revenue per Student  10.361   9.807   202.611
(in thousands of dollars)  (2.75)***  (6.81)***    (5.31)***
Enrollment    1.475   1.707    75.194
(in thousands)  (1.08)  (3.06)***    (5.36)***
PhDs Granted per   30.560 25.049   157.016
Faculty Member 1957-66  (1.47)  (3.59)***    (0.72)
Adjusted R
2  0.3564  0.6962  0.5313
Observations     462     472     472
                                                                                                                                    
Notes to Table 5: t-statistics in parenthesis. One star indicates the 10 percent level of
significance; two stars, 5 percent; three stars, 1 percent.                                                                                                                                                
Table 6
The Estimated Relationship between University
Governance and Performance Residuals
                                                                                                                                                
       SAT      Gourman        Faculty
       Scores      Rating        Salaries
Intercept   1057.515      394.460        10626.00
    (173.18)***     (116.79)***       (146.13)***
APT Decisions       14.767         4.771        125.573
Residual     (3.01)***       (1.77)*         (2.20)*
Curriculum Decisions       -3.692         2.202            8.855
Residual     (0.72)       (0.78)         (0.15)
Faculty Governance       16.778         0.812         67.187
Decisions Residual     (3.39)***       (0.29)         (1.10)
Organizational Governance     -10.383       -3.544       -84.360
Decisions Residual     (1.77)*       (1.11)         (1.22)
Financial Decisions    -12.347       -2.174      -16.197
Residual     (1.52)*       (0.48)         (0.16)
Individual Decisions       1.458       -7.087       -44.875
Residual     (0.15)       (1.35)         (0.40)
Student Governance    -10.138        2.140        27.536
Decisions Residual     (2.05)**       (0.76)         (0.46)
Adjusted R
2      0.0468    -0.0006       0.0028
Observations        462         472          472
                                                                                                                                    
Notes to Table 6: t-statistics in parenthesis. One star indicates the 10 percent level of
significance; two stars, 5 percent; three stars, 1 percent.Endnotes
1 In larger institutions where individual departments and schools have more control over
curricular decisions without oversight by larger faculty groups, there may be more chance
that these faculty sub-units are able to make bad choices. However, in larger institutions
the competition among departments and schools for resources and students should limit
these problems.
2 In Carmichael’s (1988) model, tenure is required to induce existing faculty members to
be willing to hire the best available faculty members. Without tenure, existing faculty
members would be hesitant to hire higher quality faculty members that could replace
them.
3 Hansmann (1996) points out that most employee owned enterprises have equal or
highly homogenous pay structures in order to avoid the costs of collective action. More
complicated and differentiated payment schemes ‘would be time-consuming and divisive
for all involved’ according to Hansmann (1996, p. 93). One expects that universities that
choose to have faculty members more actively involved in individual performance
decisions would also have more equal pay structures for similar reasons. To the extent
that equal pay structures do not provide optimal work incentives, output would be
reduced. Alternatively, universities that have more equal pay structures are more likely to
attract a more homogenous set of faculty members.
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
5 For a more detailed description of the survey see AAUP Bulletin (1971), McCormick
and Meiners (1988), Masten (1997).
6 The SAT data was obtained from American Universities and Colleges (1968). Reported
ACT scores were converted to SAT scores by multiplying by 17.78. This converts the
maximum SAT Score of 90 into the equivalent maximum SAT score of 1600. It also
converts our sample mean ACT score of 59.99 to 1067, which is very close to the mean
SAT value of 1061. The AAUP survey was conducted in 1970. McCormick and Meiners
(1988) use data from American Universities and Colleges for 1971. Data from 1968 is
used here in order to be more directly comparable to the other performance data.
7 McCormick and Meiners (1988) actually use faculty salaries as a determinant of
performance. However, Solmon (1975) and Dolan, Jung, and Schmidt (1985) each use
this variable as a measure of performance instead of a determinant of performance.
Solmon (1975) also finds a high degree of correlation between the Gourman variable,
SAT scores, and faculty salaries as measures of performance. This paper assumes faculty
salaries are more likely a measure of performance. When the salary variable is included
as an explanatory variable for the other performance variables, the results are almost
identical to those reported. Hence, the results do not seem to be driven by the inclusion or
exclusion of the salary variables.
8 The analysis assumes that the relationship between faculty participation in governance
is strictly linear. However, this may not be true. In fact, there is likely to be an optimal
range of faculty participation for each type of decision. Several alternative non-linear
specifications have been attempted with little success. However, it is asking a lot of the
data to pick up these relationships especially when it may vary across decision group and
performance data. It is likely that better data and more powerful tests would find a non-
linear relationship.                                                                                                                                                                    
9 See Masten (1997) for a further discussion of the relationship between the AAUP
survey ratings and university characteristics.
10 Part of the problem with the Gourman variable is that if we include all the
characteristics used to develop this measure we would eventually obtain an R
2
approaching one and coefficients estimates equal to the weights used to calculate this
variable. This may explain our finding for this variable but not the salary variable.